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ABSTRACT
The implementation of diversity in testbeds is essential to
understanding and improving the security and resilience of
Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Employing a wide spec-
trum of equipment, diverse networks, and business processes,
as deployed in real-life infrastructures, is particularly diffi-
cult in experimental conditions. However, this level of di-
versity is key from a security perspective, as attackers can
exploit system particularities and process intricacies to their
advantage. This paper presents an ICS testbed with specific
focus on infrastructure diversity, and end-to-end business
process replication. These qualities are illustrated through a
case study mapping data flow/processing, user interactions,
and two example attack scenarios.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.3 [Special Purpose and Application-Based Systems]:
industrial control systems
General Terms
Security, Human Factors, Experimentation, Design
Keywords
Industrial Control System; ICS; Supervisory Control and
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1. INTRODUCTION
The use of testbeds is essential to understanding and improv-
ing the security and resilience of Industrial Control Systems
(ICS). The wide spectrum of equipment, diverse networks,
and business processes, deployed in real-world infrastruc-
tures is particularly difficult to replicate in experimental
conditions. ICS broadly spans across three fundamentally
different zones, with a variety of equipment, skill-sets, and
role groups, each summarised here.
• The manufacturing zone is where physical process op-
erations take place, prominently built around devices
and systems broadly categorised as operational tech-
nology (OT), used for monitoring, controlling, and au-
tomating process decisions through the implementa-
tion of sensors, actuators, and controllers. Observa-
tion and manual control of physical processes though
human machine interfaces (HMI), engineering work-
stations, remote terminal units (RTU), data histori-
ans, and control servers, is also possible within this
zone.
• The demilitarised zone forms a boundary between man-
ufacturing zones and enterprise zones, presenting an
interface by which data can be captured and stored
for further processing. Performing critical functions,
devices residing in this zone lean towards conventional
information technology (IT), yet have the ability to
interact with OT, facilitating remote alarm manage-
ment, historical data collection, remote desktop access,
etc.
• The enterprise zone hosts conventional IT devices and
systems, further utilising data collected through the
demilitarised zone to perform global supervision and
long-term strategic planning for the entire infrastruc-
ture.
For a more granular view of end-to-end ICS environments,
see the Purdue model (figure 1).
Figure 1: The Purdue Model [2]
The level of diversity in ICS environments is important from
a security perspective, as attackers are able to focus their
attacks to disrupt operational objects derived from varying
ICS zones. First, consider a “Fuzzing” attack exploiting a
controller vulnerability; secondly, a controller “Memory Ma-
nipulation”. The two attacks vary in their outcome. The
first could be considered a disruption attack, designed to
cause an undesired impact on physical process operations.
The second manipulates data used for a variety of objectives,
opening several possible end results (reduced efficiency, con-
fusion, disruption, etc.), impacting local and/or remote level
(demilitarised zone and enterprise zone) visibility and con-
trol of operational processes, and data.
The modus operandi of the aforementioned attacks is also
significantly different: a “Fuzzing” attack is relatively sim-
ple to carry out, and the process (target identification fol-
lowed by target disruption) can be automatised; “Memory
Manipulation” attacks requires an advanced understanding
of the target network (data sources and destinations, criti-
cal data processing points, redundancy, etc.), and dedicated
expertise to intercept and alter a specific data flow.
This paper presents an ICS testbed [5], with a focus on in-
frastructure diversity, including end-to-end business process
replication (section 3). The testbed replicates not only in-
frastructure found within each zone (field sites, data-centres,
and corporate sites), but for each zone proposes alternative
forms of equipment, vendors, and protocols. These qualities
are illustrated through the introduction of a case study, and
two example attack scenarios (section 4). Section 5 investi-
gates potential future work, notably related to the incoming
Internet of Things (IoT) evolution.
2. RELATED WORK
Several testbeds have been proposed in the literature for
power plants [7], and micro and macro grids [6, 3], based on
combinations of real, emulated, and simulated components.
Testbeds focusing on water treatment and distribution are
less common than power grid oriented testbeds: [1] relies on
simulation and virtualisation to reproduce large water in-
frastructures, favouring the scale and breadth of the testbed
over the realism of deploying actual physical components.
Some testbeds cover different sectors (power grid, water,
gas): [8] is a simulation tool for building various SCADA
infrastructures at scale; [9] proposes a combination of phys-
ical and simulated components.
The testbeds referenced here are spanning all zones of the
Purdue reference model, although they do not always re-
fer to this model explicitly. A variety of attacks has been
studied in these environments, including Denial of Service
(DoS, either by flooding or specific malicious packets), DNS
and routing tables poisoning, traffic sniffing and Man In
The Middle (MITM), and malware injections. However, the
socio-technical particularities of each zone, and the propa-
gation of attack effects across different environments, repre-
sent blind spots in these studies, as they generally focus on
specific attacks and/or scenarios.
3. TESTBED ARCHITECTURE
As detailed in [5] the testbed was originally designed with
three core factors in mind, flexibility, credibility, and reliabil-
ity. Since its original conception in 2013, major works have
been undertaken to further levels of diversity, and therefore
credibility when compared with real-world scenarios. Fig-
ure 2 presents the diversity of each zone. Below we describe
each zone in relation to the available devices and protocols.
Manufacturing zone: The physical process is built around
a set of operational assets (tanks, pipes, pumps, valves, etc.),
sensors, and actuators, supporting hard wired electrical sig-
nalling, such as 4-20mA, and wireless protocol technologies,
such as WirelessHART. The monitoring, control, and au-
tomation of physical processes are achieved through a set of
sensors, controllers, human machine interfaces (HMI), and
network devices. These support the following protocols: S7
over MPI, S7 over Ethernet, DNP3, ModbusTCP, Profibus,
Profinet, WirelessHART, OPC, RDP, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP,
SFTP, TFTP, SSH, and Telnet.
Demilitarised zone: This zone contains a set of communi-
cation devices and servers supporting the handling of all IP
based protocols discussed within the manufacturing zone.
Enterprise zone: This zone contains a number of work-
stations and servers supporting the handling of all IP based
protocols discussed within the manufacturing zone.
4. ATTACK SCENARIOS
Figure 3 and table 1 are the output of a case study with a
European utility company. Figure 3 provides a greater level
of granularity on real-world data flow and processing, and
has been replicated within the testbed environment. Table
1 provides a view of some critical role groups, spread across
each ICS level [2].
Colour coded to provide basic guidance on the level in which
each device resides, figure 3 can be mapped against role
groups from table 1. As a risk assessment tool, the creation
of data flow/process models, with accompanying role groups,
provides a clear end-to-end view of the system.
Figure 3, highlights the complexity of data flow/processing.
Operating at an abstracted level, we see the delegation of de-
vices to meet the requirements of specific role groups. How-
ever, perhaps of greater interest is the lower-level view pre-
sented by the programmable logic controller (PLC). Here we
see areas of PLC resources separated and shared based on
their functionality. Take ”DB2.DBD1” as an example, this
is a datablock address, an area of memory allocated for a
specific function, in this case storing an input value. It is
shared between three system levels (1,2, and 3), used as an
input for Historian and RTU data collection.
Where the following sub sections introduce two attack sce-
narios, developed and applied within the testbed environ-
ment, identification of data processing points and user in-
teraction, plays a critical part in the holistic understanding
of potential impact.
4.1 Fuzzing
”Fuzzing”, is considered to be a blackbox security evalua-
tion technique. Applied to discover software vulnerabilities,
Fuzzing randomly mutates well-formed inputs, testing a pro-
Figure 2: High-level architecture of the testbed
Figure 3: Data flow and processing
grams resilience upon their receipt [4]. Existing works dis-
cuss the application of fuzzing to ICS environments [10].
It is possible to conceive a vast array of opportunities where
such testing/attacks could be conducted within the testbed
User Roles ICS Level
Process Control Operators 2,3,4,5
Local Process Managers 2,3,4,5
Regional Process Managers 3,4,5
Regulatory Monitors/Testers 2,3,4,5
Performance Analysts 4,5
3rd Party Contractors 0,1,2,3,DMZ,4,5
Alarm Management Cetre Operator 4,5
Health and Safety Officers 4,5
Home Workers 3,4,5
Support/Maintenance Roles ICS Level
Electrical Engineers 0,1,2,5
Mechanical Engineers 0,5




Information Technology Engineers DMZ,4,5
3rd Party Contractors 0,1,2,3,DMZ,4,5
Home Workers 3,4,5
Table 1: ICS roles and associated system levels
(section 3). Using figure 3, critical data processing points
can be identified as described above. A number of which,
where disrupted, could create a cascading effect up the data
flow. For example, we applied a standard Fuzzing technique
to the PLC, this caused the PLC to fail, requiring a manual
reset (power down and up). This is where such attacks can
prove devastating to process operations, and remote moni-
toring. While no level of resilience is configure to provide
a replication of the PLC functionality, duplication of sensor
data into a local monitor and RTU, directly from the ul-
trasonic sensor, still provided certain role groups access to
critical data, highlighting an undesired change has occurred.
4.2 Memory Modification
”Memory Modification”modifies data stored in memory. Tools
such as Snap7 [11] facilitate such modifications, providing
an interface with Siemens PLCs over the S7 protocol. Con-
sider the memory location discussed above (DB2.DBD1);
once data flows and processing points are understood, se-
lection and modification of memory locations such as this
provide an excellent opportunity to cause physical process
disruption, and/or inaccurate reporting/alarm management
data.
We applied the Snap7 tool to DB2.DBD1, modifying the
value beyond its normal operating boundaries. While this
had no impact on the physical process, as the data pro-
cessed through the RTU and historian (monitoring only),
it moved up the data flow and into systems residing within
the DMZ and Enterprise zones; this created warnings to sys-
tem users that discrepancies between RTU and PLC derived
data points have arisen. However, as the level of complex-
ity found in historian calculations can be high, with reliance
on the PLC alone for accurate data, it is possible that if
left unchanged for some time, performance based analysis
and investment decision could be made based on inaccu-
rate data. This brings us back to the requirement for end-
to-end testbed environments, and clear mapping of critical
data processing points, with criticality not only identified
based on the impact to operational processes, but holistic
role group interaction/requirements.
5. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
In the near future, Internet of Things (IoT) devices are ex-
pected to invade a number of industries, including ICS. The
extreme dynamism and diversity of the IoT contrast strongly
with the slow, monolithic evolution rate of ICS. Our testbed
will investigate ICS-IoT interactions through extensions to
the existing infrastructure, in particular in terms of wireless
technologies and wireless sensors. The diversity showcased
in the testbed is also a motivation for automation to replace
tedious manual adaptations to all particular devices and
environments. Furthermore, formal modelling of system-
user interaction and identification of critical data processing
points as demonstrated earlier in this paper will be explored
as promising and vital parts of our future research.
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